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Abstract
Does economic development have an unavoidable ecological cost? We examine
the ecological impacts of one of India’s signature place-based economic policies
involving massive tax benefits for new industrial and infrastructure development
following the creation of the new state of Uttarakhand. The policy, which had an
explicit pro-environment mandate, resulted in no meaningful change in local for-
est cover. Our results suggest that even in settings with low levels of enforcement,
place-based economic policies with pro-environment mandates can achieve size-
able economic expansion without major ecological costs.
Keywords: place-based economic policies, agglomeration, deforestation
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1 Introduction
The central challenge of sustainable development is bridging the gap between rich and
poor regions without lasting damage to the environment that could in turn under-
mine the goal of poverty alleviation (United Nations, 2015). Indeed, there has been
a long-standing debate in both the conservation and economics literature on the ef-
fects of economic development and policies that encourage such development on the
environment (Arrow et al., 1995; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Stern, Common and
Barbier, 1996; Andreoni and Levinson, 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003; Dasgupta,
2007; Alix-Garcia et al., 2013; Asher, Garg and Novosad, 2020). Increasingly, govern-
ments around the world are using place-based policies – policies that target tax breaks
or infrastructure development to an underdeveloped region – as a means to close the
rising gaps between regions within their borders (Felkner and Townsend, 2011; Busso,
Gregory and Kline, 2013; Kline and Moretti, 2014; Shenoy, 2018). Yet even as these poli-
cies become ubiquitous, relatively little is known about their environmental impacts,
particularly in developing countries (Greenstone and Jack, 2015).
We focus on a principal concern about such targeted development, the risk that
forests will be cleared in the wake of infrastructure investments (Asher, Garg and Novosad,
2020) and rising incomes (Alix-Garcia et al., 2013). In the context of place-based eco-
nomic policies, such land-use change is particularly relevant since these policies often
target remote and previously underdeveloped regions with native vegetation. Further-
more, forest cover loss is an urgent concern, generating global greenhouse emissions
(IPCC, 2014; Jayachandran et al., 2017) and local health externalities (Bauch et al., 2015;
Garg, 2019; Masuda et al., 2019). The most recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that restoring and protecting forests could yield
almost a sixth of the emissions mitigation required to prevent runaway climate change
by 2030 (IPCC, 2019).
We exploit a spatial discontinuity in the introduction of one of the world’s most gen-
erous place-based policies. In 2002, the Government of India provided tax breaks and
infrastructure investments worth nearly $34 billion to the recently formed state of Ut-
tarakhand. The policy had an important additional feature, an explicit pro-environment
mandate that excluded certain environmentally detrimental industries from receiving
any subsidies or tax-exemptions while favoring industries generally considered envi-
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ronmentally friendly.1 Our setting is particularly important because Uttarakhand con-
tains one of the only large contiguous tracts of forest in Northern India, with over 63%
of the area in the state under forest cover. The region has also historically identified
with the environmental conservation movement as the birthplace of the Chipko Move-
ment that encouraged local residents to hug trees in order to dissuade logging efforts.
The introduction of large scale regional investment in infrastructure and production
subsidies can have ambiguous effects on forest cover. Timber demand can increase
either because rising incomes induce demand for land-intensive goods (Alix-Garcia
et al., 2013) or highways and other infrastructure expand the scope for wood-using
industry (Asher, Garg and Novosad, 2020). At the same time, increased industrial ac-
tivity could be associated with exits from agriculture and affect demands on forested
land from the agricultural sector (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2017; Abman and Carney, 2019). Yet,
other interventions such as alternative energy sources, even while ex-ante promising,
have failed to reduce forest loss except when accompanied by complimentary policies
(Meeks, Sims and Thompson, 2019). Overall, the effect of directed, geographically con-
centrated economic growth on forest cover is ambiguous.
Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, we find that the introduction of these
subsidies had a small, statistically insignificant effect on forest cover, even 10 years after
the introduction of the policy. By contrast, the same policy increased economic activity
by at least 70% and as much as 300% (Shenoy, 2018). We find no evidence to suggest
that the null effects are driven by spillovers across the border or within-borders. Ten
years after the introduction of the policy, we show that the absolute increase in employ-
ment in wood-using firms is modest relative to the overall expansion in employment.
Together, our results demonstrate that at least in terms of forest cover, place-based
economic policies with pro-environment riders can achieve large economic expansion
with relatively minimal environmental costs.
While a broad literature has documented the relationship between economic de-
velopment and environmental quality – often characterized as the “Environmental
Kuznets Curve” – to the best of our knowledge, none have considered the ecological
effects of place-based economic policies.2 Unlike other development policies, place-
1In the Appendix, we provide both the “positive” or encouraged environmentally friendly list and
the “negative” or environmentally unfriendly list of industries.
2Other papers have considered cash transfers (Alix-Garcia et al., 2013; Wilebore et al., 2019), rural
2
based economic policies target an underdeveloped region rather than a segment of
the population (e.g. the rural poor). One aim of these policies is to concentrate de-
velopment in a region to generate a new center of agglomeration. These agglomera-
tions could damage the environment by fostering industries that clear land and con-
sume timber, or they could preserve it by concentrating people and economic activity
within a few cities while leaving forests to regenerate. And by targeting firms rather
than individuals, a place-based policy has the potential to shift production away from
environmentally-intensive industries. The environmental damage done in developing
countries by rapid industrialization continues to be a major source of controversy and
therefore it is crucial to understand whether a carefully designed place-based policy
can achieve major economic development without causing major ecological harm.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following sections. In Section 2, we provide
background on the policy and describe our data sources. In Section 3 we outline the
research design and in Section 4 we discuss the corresponding results. In Section 5 we
offer concluding remarks.
2 Background and Data
2.1 The Policy
In 2002, the federal government initiated of a series of separate initiatives targeting the
state of Uttarakhand (Shenoy, 2018). These included spending for new infrastructure,
better access to existing infrastructure, and business tax exemptions. Though some of
these funds were available ever since the state was formed in late 2000, it was only in
2002 that it began concentrating the funds in a handful of industrial estates along the
border between Uttarakhand and the state of Uttar Pradesh to the south. These estates
play a key role in the raft of tax exemptions that were specifically designed to spur
growth without harming the environment.
credit (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2019), agriculture (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2017; Abman and Carney, 2019) and trade
(Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2004). There is also an extensive litera-
ture documenting the relationship between economic development and the environment. For a non-
exhaustive list, see: Den Butter and Verbruggen (1994); Arrow et al. (1995); Grossman and Krueger
(1995); Stern, Common and Barbier (1996); Andreoni and Levinson (2001); Dasgupta et al. (2002); Foster
and Rosenzweig (2003); Stern (2004). For a through review on drivers of deforestation, see Busch and
Ferretti-Gallon (2017).
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These exemptions, titled the “Special Package Scheme for Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand,” were first announced in March of 2002 with an effective date of 2003.
The most generous include a complete exemption from federal income taxes for the
first 5 years of production (and a 30 percent reduction for the next 5 years); a complete
exemption from excise taxes for 10 years; and a 15 percent investment subsidy for new
or expanded factories. For comparison, in 2003 the two exemptions bought relief from
a statutory corporate tax rate of 36.75 percent and an excise tax of 16 percent.3
Firms can only exploit the investment subsidy and excise tax exemption if they build
and produce within Uttarakhand, giving firms an incentive to move factories rather
than just their nominal headquarters. Figure A.1, which shows the change in the num-
ber of factories, makes it clear that firms were responding in part to the tax incentives.
Only factories registered by 2010 could claim the excise tax exemption. After the dead-
line the rate of new registrations drops sharply, suggesting that firms pushed forward
their investment to exploit the policy.
The tax exemptions were designed to attract certain industries at the expense of oth-
ers. The government published a “positive” list of industries that it considered “envi-
ronmentally friendly” (Government of India, 2003). These include floriculture, honey,
and goods related to tourism (especially “eco-tourism”). Unlike most firms, which got
tax exemptions at establishments within approved industrial estates, firms in the pos-
itive industries were eligible throughout the state. There was likewise a “negative”
list of industries denied any tax benefits regardless of their location. The negative list
includes coal and oil-based power plants, wood pulp, and most paper products. The
complete positive and negative lists are provided in the Appendix.
The explicit environmental focus of the policy is in part a consequence of Uttarak-
hand’s history. The movement that ultimately led to its creation had its roots in environ-
mentalist protests triggered by timber concessions many decades ago (Tillin, 2013). The
policy was a calibrated attempt by the central government to win political support in
the new state by promoting economic development without alienating the still-potent
environmentalist movement.
The firms ultimately attracted to the industrial estates produce goods across all in-
dustries. Aside from information technology firms specifically courted by the IT Park
3As explained in Shenoy (2018), the effective rate is somewhat lower but still far from trivial.
4
at Dehradun’s estate, nearly all registrants at the estates are in manufacturing. They
produce everything from processed food to processed metals, Ayurvedic medicine to
automobile parts, plastics to pharmaceuticals. Though paper products are supposedly
excluded from the tax subsidies, there are still a non-trivial number of firms that pro-
duce boxes and packaging (possibly to supply the other firms). Given their presence
it is not a foregone conclusion that the program caused little deforestation. That is an
empirical question to which we devote the rest of the paper.
2.2 Data
Forest Cover: Detailed and reliable administrative records on forest cover and defor-
estation rarely exist, especially in developing countries. Instead, we obtain high res-
olution time series estimates of forest cover using a standardized publicly-available
satellite-based dataset. Vegetation Continuous Fields (VCF) is available at 250m reso-
lution and provides annual tree cover from 2000–2014 in the form of the percentage of
each pixel under forest cover (Townshend et al., 2011).4 For our primary specification,
we define forest cover as the average percentage of forest cover in a pixel. Our results
are robust to using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Firm Level Data: We obtain data on firms and employment from the the 1998 and 2013
Economic Census.5 These data were merged to the Socioeconomic High-resolution
Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset on India (SHRUG) and collapsed to a SHRUG loca-
tion, which is the lowest identifiable census unit, either village or town (Asher et al.,
2019). Our regressions thus give the impact on employment in the average census lo-
cation.
Borders: We measure the discontinuous change in outcomes at the state boundaries by
4Some previous studies have used Global Forest Cover (GFC) dataset that describes baseline forest
cover in the year 2000, and a binary indicator for the year of deforestation for each 30mX30m pixel. As
noted in Asher, Garg and Novosad (2020), GFC is less useful for the study of forest cover in India because
GFC does not capture forest gains in areas with positive baseline forest cover or partial forest loss. While
GFC is an excellent source for other contexts such as Brazil and Indonesia, it is less suitable in the Indian
context which saw overall increases in forest cover during our study period. For more information on
the comparability of different forest cover datasets in India, see Asher, Garg and Novosad (2020).
5While there was an economic census conducted in 2005, employment figures for logging firms were
combined with those engaged in afforestation practices and hence are unsuitable for the analysis in this
paper.
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linking the forest cover and firm-level data to shapefiles of administrative boundaries
created by ML Infomap. These data give the border between Uttar Pradesh (control
state) and Uttarakhand (treated state) as well as sub-districts, which we use as clusters
in calculating standard errors.
3 Research Design
3.1 Forest Cover
Our design closely matches that of Shenoy (2018), which is based on the assumption
that there are parallel trends at the border. Shenoy (2018) shows that although there are
clear differential trends between Uttarakhand (the treated state) and Uttar Pradesh (the
control state), these differences become statistically and economically insignificant at
the border. We measure the impact of the policy on deforestation and other outcomes
using three specifications that compare the difference in the discontinuity at the border
across years, making this a difference-in-discontinuities approach.
The first specification uses a spatial polynomial in latitude and longitude to control
for bias. Like Dell (2010) our control function is a third-order polynomial in the latitude
and longitude of each observation. This control function absorbs all smooth variation
in the outcome. The effect is measured by the coefficient on an indicator for being in
the targeted state, which captures the discontinuous change at the border. Let i index
each cell, let t be the year of observation, and let P 3 be a third-order polynomial in the
latitude and longitude of the centroid of each cell. We estimate
[Tree Cover]i,t = [Fixed Effect]i +
2014∑
t=2001
κt[Y ear Dummy]t
+
2014∑
t=2001
[Y ear Dummy]t × P 3t ([Lat]i, [Lon]i)
+
2014∑
t=2001
βSt [Y ear Dummy]t × [Targeted]i + [Error]i,t
(1)
where [Targeted] is an indicator for whether the cell is inside the targeted region. There
is no direct term for the polynomialP 3(·) or the dummy [Targeted] because they are ab-
sorbed into the fixed-effect. The coefficients {βSt }measure the effect at the new border,
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relative to its effect in 2000, in each year before and after the policy.
The second approach uses the distance to the new border as a univariate running
variable. LetLt([Distance]i, [Targeted]i) = ω1,t[Distance]i+ω2,t[Distance]i×[Targeted]i.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) we estimate a local linear regression of the form
[Tree Cover]i,t = [Fixed Effect]i +
2014∑
t=2001
κt[Y ear Dummy]t
+
2014∑
t=2001
[Y ear Dummy]t × Lt([Distance]i, [Targeted]i)
+
2014∑
t=2001
βDt [Y ear Dummy]t × [Targeted]i + [Error]i,t
(2)
Similar to the first specification, the coefficients {βDt } measure the effect at the new
border.
The third specification is the simplest: a comparison of means very close to the
border. Using only observations within 4 kilometers of the border we estimate
[Tree Cover]i,t = [Fixed Effect]i +
2014∑
t=2001
κt[Y ear Dummy]t
+
2014∑
t=2001
βCt [Y ear Dummy]t × [Targeted]i + [Error]i,t
(3)
to yield estimates {βCt }.
We also estimate average program impacts by pooling pre- and post-program years
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in all three specifications:
[Tree Cover]i,t = [Fixed Effect]i +
2014∑
t=2001
κt[Y ear Dummy]t
+ [Post]t × P 3t ([Lat]i, [Lon]i) + βS [Post]t × [Targeted]i + [Error]i,t
(4)
[Tree Cover]i,t = [Fixed Effect]i +
2014∑
t=2001
κt[Y ear Dummy]t
+ [Post]t × Lt([Distance]i, [Targeted]i)
+ βD[Post]t × [Targeted]i + [Error]i,t
(5)
[Tree Cover]i,t = [Fixed Effect]i +
2014∑
t=2001
κt[Y ear Dummy]t
+ βC [Post]t × [Targeted]i + [Error]i,t
(6)
All specifications cluster standard errors by sub-district to account for arbitrary cor-
relation in the error term across time and space. Shenoy (2018) shows using in Monte
Carlo simulations that clustering by subdistrict yields hypothesis tests of the proper
size. Since the number of clusters in the third specification is small, we show in Ap-
pendix Table A.2 that bootstrapped standard errors yield similar results to asymptotic
errors. We use a bandwidth of 30 kilometers to estimate the first two specifications,
and a bandwidth of 4 kilometers for the third.
3.2 Employment and Firm Growth
Since the 2005 Economic Census did not separate logging and tree-felling from other
forestry industries (e.g. forest conservation), we must rely on only the 1998 and 2013
rounds. Since there are only two periods (pre and post), the specifications of Section 3.1
are not identified. We instead take the location-level change from 1998 to 2013 and run
a local linear regression with a triangular kernel. Since the difference-in-discontinuities
is now essentially a standard regression discontinuity design (but taking a difference
as the outcome), we can follow the method of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).
We estimate
∆[Outcome]i = pi0 +pi1[Distance]i+pi2[Distance]i× [Targeted]i+ω[Targeted]i+[Error]i (7)
again clustering by sub-district.
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4 Results
We report two principal findings in this paper. First, across a number of specifications
and robustness checks we find that the policy had a small and statistically insignificant
effect on forest cover. The effect is especially small relative to the expansion of economic
activity. Second, we find a precisely estimated impact on employment in logging and
wood-using firms that, though positive, is small relative to the overall expansion of
employment. Finally, we discuss potential threats to our research design, most notably
the risk that forest loss is displaced from treatment to control areas.
Effect on Forest Cover: Figure 1 compares raw average night time luminosity (left
panel) to average forest cover (right panel) within 10 kilometers on either side of the
discontinuity. While average night time luminosity between treatment and control ar-
eas diverges substantially within a few years of the introduction of the policy (2002),
average forest cover in treatment areas tracks closely with average forest cover in con-
trol areas showing no divergence in trends.
Figure 2 shows the discontinuity at the border in average forest cover in the years
2000 (left panel) and 2014 (right panel). Even 12 years after the introduction of the
policy, and four years after the end of the policy, there is no discernible difference in
forest cover at the border.
Figure 3 shows the year-by-year estimates corresponding to each of the Equations
1—3. In all three figures, each estimate provides the discontinuous change in tree cover
at the boundary relative to the discontinuity in the year 2000. The red line indicates the
year 2000 when the policy came into effect. Across all three specifications, we observe
a small negative effect of the policy on forest cover.
We formally estimate the effect of the policy on tree cover and report the aggregate
results of our difference-in-discontinuities design in Table 1. In Column (1) we employ
a spatial polynomial estimator, in Column (2) we use a distance to border approach and
in Column (3) we calculate a simple difference of means. Across all three specifications,
we find that the shift in the estimate at the border before and after the implementation
of policy was small and statistically insignificant at conventional levels. These null ef-
fects are unlikely to be the result of a lack of statistical power; indeed our results on
employment reported subsequently show that our design has statistical power to pick
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up even small changes in forest cover/employment if they exist. Using our preferred
specification in Column (1) we find a mean reduction of 0.49 percentage points or 2.98%
of forest cover. Based on a 95% confidence interval, we can reject forest loss in excess of
1.37 percentage points or 8.3%. We are able to reject similar increases using alternative
specifications (Columns 2 - 3). Our results are robust to using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation of the dependent variable (Appendix Figure A.4, Appendix Table
A.1).
Effect on Employment: Table 2 shows the effects of the policy on employment in all
firms and specifically the subset of firms in the logging industry and more generally in
industries where the primary input is raw lumber. We find there is a marked increase
in overall employment. In Column (1) we show that employment increased by 104.36
persons in each census location and the effect is significant at the 1% level. Compared
to a baseline treatment group mean of 64 employed persons per census location, this
translates to a 130% increase in overall employment. By contrast, we see a precise but
modest increase in employment in logging firms. The average census location saw an
increase of 0.56 workers in this category (Column 2, Table 2). There was virtually no
employment in this sector on either side of the discontinuity before the implementation
of the policy. Logging firms represent 0.54% of total change in employment as a result
of policy. When considering wood-using firms (Column 3, Table 2), we find that the
policy increased employment in this category by nearly 7 workers per census location,
or 6.56% of overall increase in employment.
Does displacement explain the null-result? One reason for our null-estimate could
be that the effect of the policy led to increased forest loss in not only the treatment area
but also the control area.6 While it is not possible to test for displacement explicitly,
in Appendix Figure A.2 we present maps of forest cover in 2000 and 2014 around the
border. As is visually evident, there is no systematic change in the control region (south
of the border) after the implementation of the policy. At endline in 2013, employment
6There is also the possibility of displacement from the border to locations in the treated state further
away from the border. However, the policy was uniformly applied throughout the state so there is no
reason to suspect that forest cover loss was displaced from one part of the state to another. Moreover, rea-
sonable alterations in the bandwidth of our discontinuity design do not overturn our result suggesting
that there is no reason to suspect spillovers to neighboring regions away from the border.
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in logging is 0.07% of total employment near the border of the control region—not
much of an increase from 0% in 1998. Moreover, we show in Figure 1 that forest cover
in the treatment area closely tracks forest cover in the control areas, before, during and
after the policy is in effect suggesting that displacement is unlikely to be the source of
our null-finding.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The rising concern of increasing, geographically-concentrated economic divisions within
national borders has spurred the growth of place-based economic policies. These poli-
cies provide incentives for industrial development and infrastructure through subsi-
dies and tax-breaks and typically target remote areas that are more likely to have native
vegetation. While concern has been expressed over the short- and long-run ecological
ramifications of such rapid development, the policy we study showed no such ramifi-
cations. Exploiting a spatial discontinuity in the policy, even ten years after its intro-
duction and four years after its end we find no effect on forest cover. By contrast, the
expansion of economic activity was massive. Finally, we find no evidence for spillovers
across the border from the treatment to the control region.
One possible reason for this win-win result is that the policy had an explicit en-
vironmental rider that excluded tax-breaks to certain environmentally detrimental in-
dustries such as pulp, paper and mining while explicitly promoting others such as
food, pharmaceuticals and non-timber forest-based products. In effect, the policy in-
creased the relative costs of setting up environmentally detrimental industries.
An important caveat for our findings is that we focus on one measure of environ-
mental quality - forest cover. Economic development can also affect air and water qual-
ity; however, the lack of detailed data during the relevant time period in our study re-
gion precludes us from estimating these effects. Future research should address other
such potential external costs of policy-driven, geographically-concentrated economic
development.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Nighttime Luminosity and Deforestation Within 10KM of
Border
We plot the mean of each outcome for cells that lie within 10 kilometers of the border.
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Figure 2: Regression Discontinuity at the Border in 2000 and 2014
We plot average tree cover against distance to the boundary (positive values are in the
targeted state). Each dot shows average tree cover within a bin, where the bins are
chosen by the variance evenly-spaced method estimated using code from Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).
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Figure 3: Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimate of Effect of PBP on Deforesation
We plot the estimates {βˆSt }, {βˆDt }, and {βˆCt } from estimating Equations 1—3. Each
estimate gives discontinuous change in tree cover at the boundary relative to the dis-
continuity in the year 2000. The red dashed line shows the first year of the policy.
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Tables
Table 1: Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimate of Place-Based Policies on Tree Cover
Spatial Polynomial Distance to Border Comparison of Means
Post-PBP -0.49 -0.31 -0.38
(0.45) (0.54) (0.53)
Cell-Years 4320 4320 1350
Cells 288 288 90
Sub-districts 38 38 26
Mean at Baseline 16.4 16.4 16.4
Estimates of βˆS, βˆD, βˆC from Equations 4—6. The outcome is the average tree cover
within each cell. Standard errors are clustered by sub-district.
Significance levels denoted at conventional levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Regression Discontinuity Estimate of PBP on Em-
ployment and Firms
All Logging Wood-Using
RD Estimate 104.36∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 6.85∗∗∗
(37.44) (0.24) (2.33)
Observations 25747 25747 25747
Sub-districts 67 67 54
Optimal BW 37.6 38.7 29.4
Control Mean, 1998 64.0 0.0 1.2
Treated Mean, 1998 80.0 0.0 3.2
We estimate Equation 7 for employment and the number
of firms within each of the given industries (“all” is all em-
ployment measured in the Economic Census). The unit of
observation is a census location (either a town or a village).
Standard errors are clustered by sub-district.
Significance levels denoted at conventional levels ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Online Appendix
Additional Figures
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Figure A.1: Registration of Firms Before and After Subsidy Deadline
Replicated from Shenoy (2018). Based on aggregate data from the Annual Survey of
Industries and the Economic Census.
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2000 2014
Figure A.2: Deforestation at the Border in 2000 and 2014
Each figure shows the raw tree cover in the area around the border between the targeted
and control states (red line). The targeted state lies to the north of the boundary. Darker
colors represent thicker tree cover.
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Figure A.3: Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimate of PBP on Night Lights (Replicated
from Shenoy (2018))
Each dot represents the average of light intensity within a 5 kilometer bin. The speci-
fication is comparable to Equation 2. The p-value gives the significance of the border
effect in the cross-sectional regression. P-values are computed from standard errors
clustered by subdistrict.
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Figure A.4: Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimate of Effect of PBP on Deforesa-
tion(IHS)
This figure is comparable to Figure 3, but applies the inverse hyperbolic sine transfor-
mation to the measure of forest cover.
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Additional Tables
Table A.1: Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimate of Place-Based Policies on Defor-
estation (IHS)
Spatial Polynomial Distance to Border Comparison of Means
Post-PBP -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Cell-Years 4320 4320 1350
Cells 288 288 90
Sub-districts 38 38 26
Outcome is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the average tree cover. The specifications
are comparable to Table 1. All standard errors are clustered by sub-district.
Significance levels denoted at conventional levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.2: Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimate of Deforestation, Bootstrapped Stan-
dard Errors
Spatial Polynomial Distance to Border Comparison of Means
Post-PBP -0.49 -0.31 -0.38
(0.45) (0.57) (0.50)
Cell-Years 4320 4320 1350
Cells 288 288 90
Sub-districts 38 38 26
Mean at Baseline 16.4 16.4 16.4
Similar to Table 1, but Columns 2 and 3 use bootstrapped standard errors. We cannot
estimate bootstrapped errors for (1) because there are too many parameters. Signifi-
cance levels denoted at conventional levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Policy Details
Positive “Thrust” Industries
• Floriculture
• Medicinal herbs and aromatic herbs etc. - processing
• Honey
• Horticulture and Agro based industries such as
– Sauces, Ketchup, etc.
– Fruit Juices & fruit pulp
– Jams, Jellies, vegetable juices, puree, pickles etc.
– Preserved fruits and vegetables
– Processing of fresh fruits and vegetables including packaging
– Processing, preservation, packaging of mushrooms.
• Food Processing Industry excluding those included in the negative list
• Sugar and its by products
• Silk and silk products
• Wool and wool products
• Woven fabrics (Excisable garments)
• Sports goods and articles and equipment for general physical exercise and equipment for
adventure sports/activities, tourism (to be separately specified)
• Paper & paper products excluding those in negative list (as per excise classification)
• Pharma products
• Information & Communication Technology Industry
• Computer hardware Call centres
• Bottling of mineral water
• Eco-tourism
• Hotels, resorts, spa, entertainment/amusement parks and ropeways
• Industrial gases (based on atmospheric fraction)
• Handicrafts
• Non-timber forest-based product industries
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Negative List
• Tobacco and tobacco products including cigarettes and pan masala
• Thermal Power Plant(coal/oil based)
• Coal washeries/dry coal processing
• Inorganic Chemicals excluding medicinal grade oxygen, medicinal grade hydrogen per-
oxide, compressed air
• Organic chemicals excluding Provitamins/vitamins, Hormones , Glycosides, sugars
• Tanning and dyeing extracts, tanins and their derivatives, dyes, colours, paints and var-
nishes; putty, fillers and other mastics; inks
• Marble and mineral substances not classified elsewhere
• Flour mills/rice mill
• Foundries using coal
• Minerals fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation;
• Bituminous substances : mineral waxes
• Synthetic rubber products
• Cement clinkers and asbestos, raw including fibre.
• Explosive (including industrial explosives, detonators & fuses, fireworks, matches, pro-
pellant powders etc.)
• Mineral or chemical fertilisers
• Insecticides, fungicides, herbicides & pesticides (basic manufacture and formulation)
• Fibre glass & articles thereof
• Manufacture of pulp - wood pulp, mechanical or chemical (including dissolving pulp)
• Branded aerated water/soft drinks (non-fruit based)
• Paper
– Writing or printing paper, etc.
– Paper or paperboard, etc.
– Maplitho paper, etc.
– Newsprint, in rolls or sheets
– Craft paper, etc.
– Sanitary towels, etc.
– Cigarette paper
– Grease-proof paper
– Toilet or facial tissue, etc.
– Paper & paper board, laminated internally with bitumen, tar or asphalt
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– Carbon or similar copying paper
– Products consisting of sheets of paper or paperboard, impregnated, coated or cov-
ered with plastics, etc.
– Paper and paperboard, coated impregnated or covered with wax, etc.
• Plastics and articles thereof
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